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legislative initiative. Again, this is as it should be. Mediation is an infor-
mal process. Informality and simplicity, the absence of rules and judicial
supervision, are among the features that make mediation so popular and
so effective. Judicial intervention, supervision, or even comment are not
to be expected.
But when we consider that another alternative to litigation is "arbitra-
tion," then there are many developments to report. In the wake of the
United States Supreme Court's 2008 ruling in Hall Street Associates,
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., holding that no longer shall such standards as
"manifest disregard of the law" be a proper basis of setting aside arbitra-
tion awards,' appellate courts everywhere have had to reevaluate and re-
verse decades of appellate law that offered participants in arbitration
some reassurance, however slight, that the proceedings and the result
would ultimately have to conform to, or bear some slight resemblance to,
the law. The notion that arbitrators are now essentially free to ignore the
law and to ignore legal precedent, when combined with the still unyield-
ing view of most courts that arbitration clauses should be recognized and
enforced with only extremely rare exception, should give a society that
values the rule of law reason to pause. How far are we willing to go down
a dual path that encourages parties, even those who resist, to exit our civil
justice system, forced to accept an adjudication where the rule of law need
not apply?
I. MEDIATION
The sole contribution of note in this Survey year that touches upon
mediation, and more particularly upon the role of the mediator, is from
the Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals. In Moore v. Altra Energy
Technologies, Inc.,2 the court of appeals examined a motion to disqualify
a law firm from representation on the basis that a partner in the law firm
had served as the mediator in the case prior to trial. In determining that
the firm should be disqualified, the court of appeals relied on the Texas
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 1.11(c) suggests that
such a conflict can possibly be cured if the lawyer/mediator "is screened
from participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee
therefrom," and "written notice is promptly given to the other parties to
the proceeding." 3 The court of appeals concluded: "[B]ecause [the attor-
ney/mediator] mediated this case, no other member of his firm could
knowingly undertake or continue Moore's representation unless the re-
quirements of subsection (c) were satisfied."4
The result is not surprising and underscores this author's observation
that most full-time, professional neutrals in Texas are either "solo practi-
1. 552 U.S. 576, 584-85 (2008).
2. 295 S.W.3d 404, 405 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
3. Id. at 406 n.1 (quoting the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct).
4. Id. (internal citation omitted).
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tioners" or practice in a small group of other full-time neutrals for a rea-
son-to avoid conflicts of interest and the appearance of such conflicts.
II. ARBITRATION
The Survey year once again saw growth in the sheer number of appel-
late decisions concerning arbitration. The majority of opinions can be
readily placed in one of two categories. First are the decisions that ad-
dress the "front end" of the process-whether an arbitration clause is
enforceable and the parties can be required to arbitrate. Second are the
decisions that deal with the "back end" of arbitration-whether an arbi-
tration award should be confirmed or set aside.
A. ENFORCING THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE
The vast majority of decisions testing the validity of a contractual arbi-
tration clause result in enforcement of the clause and an order to
arbitrate.
1. Non-Signatory Claims Brought by Survivors and Beneficiaries
A cluster of decisions addressed whether the claims of a surviving
spouse and children must be arbitrated when the decedent employee had
signed a binding arbitration agreement with his employer. This issue is
one example of cases in which courts must decide whether non-signato-
ries can be bound by an arbitration agreement.
In In re Labatt Food Service, L.P.,5 the Texas Supreme Court addressed
whether a wrongful death beneficiary is bound by a pre-death contractual
arbitration agreement between the decedent and his employer. In
Labatt, the agreement was an "occupational injury plan" in which em-
ployees could participate; the employer had opted not to subscribe to
workers' compensation. The case turned on the derivative nature of the
wrongful death claim.6 Because the claim was derivative, the statutory
beneficiaries were bound by the agreement. "If Dancy [the decedent]
had sued Labatt [his employer] for his own injuries immediately prior to
his death, he would have been compelled to arbitrate his claims pursuant
to his agreement. His beneficiaries, therefore, must arbitrate as their
right to maintain a wrongful death action is entirely derivative of Dancy's
rights." 7
Likewise, in Graves v. BP America, Inc.,8 the Fifth Circuit ruled that
"the statutory beneficiaries of a wrongful death action in Texas are bound
by an arbitration agreement between the decedent and his employer."9
5. 279 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex. 2009).
6. Id. at 649.
7. Id.; see also In re Jindal Saw Ltd., 289 S.W.3d 827, 827 (Tex. 2009) (citing In re
Labatt and ruling that "an arbitration agreement between a decedent and his employer
requires the employee's wrongful death beneficiaries to arbitrate their claims").
8. 568 F.3d 221 (5th Cir. 2009).
9. Id. at 224.
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Relying in part on the Texas Supreme Court's decision in In re Labatt,'0
the Fifth Circuit also stated, "This case does not require us to decide the
choice-of-law issue because we, like other courts before us, can simply
note that federal law and state law dovetail to provide the same out-
come."" Because In re Labatt defined a Texas wrongful death action as
entirely derivative of the decedent's rights, and because under federal
common law "[t]he 'direct benefits' version of estoppel applies [to pre-
vent] a nonsignatory from knowingly exploiting the agreement containing
an arbitration clause," the Fifth Circuit concluded that a nonsignatory
cannot sue under an agreement (the employment contract) and then
avoid its arbitration clause. 12
2. Other Non-Signatory Claims
In Stanford Development Corp. v. Stanford Condominium Owners
Ass'n,13 the issue was whether a condominium homeowners' association
that brings suit against the condominium developer on behalf of its mem-
bers was bound by the arbitration clauses found in the individual earnest
money contracts between each of the members and the developer. In a
helpful analysis, the Houston First Court of Appeals found that six theo-
ries had been previously recognized "that may bind nonsignatories to ar-
bitration agreements: (1) incorporation by reference, (2) assumption, (3)
agency, (4) alter ego, (5) equitable estoppel, and (6) third-party benefici-
ary." 14 Apparently relying on the fifth exception to the signatory rule,
the court of appeals compelled arbitration of the Association's claims:
"The Association's pleading clearly alleges that it is bringing suit on be-
half of its constituent owners. . . . [Ilts rights are limited to those pos-
sessed by the people it represents. Because the homeowners are bound
by arbitration agreements, and the Association has sued on their behalf,
it, too, is bound by the agreements."' 5
3. Attorney-Client Contracts
In the context of written services and fee agreements between counsel
and client, it is often argued that ethical duties and obligations of the
attorney should render arbitration clauses unenforceable. On remand
from the Texas Supreme Court, the Houston First Court of Appeals, with
very little discussion of the legal ethics arguments, disagreed. In Cham-
bers v. O'Quinn,16 the former client asserted that "unlike ordinary com-
mercial contractual relationships, the fiduciary nature of the
attorney-client relationship dictates against an attorney's ability to im-
10. 279 S.W.3d 640.
11. Graves, 568 F.3d at 223 (internal citation omitted).
12. Id.
13. 285 S.W.3d 45, 46 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
14. Id. at 48-49 (citing In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex.
2005)).
15. Id. at 50.
16. 305 S.W.3d 141 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).
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pose an arbitration condition on a client."' 7 Because the arbitration
clause at issue dictated, "This contract is subject to arbitration under the
Texas general arbitration statute," the court of appeals seemed to view a
statutory analysis as dispositive.18 The Texas arbitration statute includes
a special requirement that "personal injury" claims, to be subject to arbi-
tration, require written acknowledgement that the client has received the
independent advice of counsel. 19 Thus, the former clients of the late
Houston attorney John O'Quinn argued that their legal malpractice
claims were akin to personal injury claims. Acknowledging a split among
the authorities on this issue, the court of appeals rejected the argument
and upheld "the majority view that legal malpractice claims are not
claims for personal injury, and, therefore, arbitration agreements are en-
forceable in the context of a legal malpractice suit." 2 0
4. Discovery First, Then Arbitration?
The Texas Supreme Court, in In re Houston Pipe Line Co. 2 1 addressed
the role of discovery and arbitration. The trial court, in a matter of con-
siderable complexity, examined an arbitration clause that imposed a
sixty-day limitation on the period for discovery in arbitration. Appar-
ently thinking that limitation was impractical, if not unfair, the trial court
ordered discovery in the lawsuit prior to ruling on a motion to compel
arbitration to allow the parties sufficient time to identify potential proper
parties and perform damages calculations. 22 The Texas Supreme Court,
however, ruled that this was an abuse of discretion.23 The supreme court
noted that, although pre-arbitration discovery is authorized by the Texas
Arbitration Act,24 such discovery may pertain only to circumstances
where the court lacks sufficient information to rule on a motion to com-
pel, such as the proper scope of the arbitration.25 "Motions to compel
arbitration and any reasonably needed discovery should be resolved with-
out delay." 26 Thus, the supreme court ruled that the trial court had
abused its discretion by allowing discovery on substantive matters prior
to ruling on the motion to compel. 27
5. Miscellaneous
Must a former securities broker arbitrate his claim that his employer
wrongfully discharged him for refusing to commit an illegal act? In In re
17. Id. at 147.
18. Id.
19. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.002(a)(3), (c)(1) (Vernon 2005).
20. Chambers, 305 S.W.3d at 148.
21. No. 08-0300, 2009 WL 1901640, at *1 (Tex. July 3, 2009).
22. Id.
23. Id. at *2.
24. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 171.023(b), 171.086(a)(4), (6) (Vernon
2005).





NEXT Financial Group, Inc., the Texas Supreme Court, relying on the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) Code that requires
arbitration of all claims which arise out of "the business activities of [an
NASD] member," determined that the former employee's whistleblower
claims arose from such "business activities" and was not a statutory em-
ployment discrimination claim.28 The latter would have qualified as an
exception under the arbitration agreement and the NASD Code.29
In an unreported decision, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals in
Nabors Wells Services, Ltd. v. Herrera compelled arbitration in the face of
these defenses: illusory contract, indefiniteness, unconscionability, and
accessibility.30
Illusory? Courts have stated that "[a]n illusory promise is one that fails
to bind the promisor because he retains the option of discontinuing per-
formance without notice." 3' The court of appeals concluded that the
agreement was not illusory because the employer's right to amend or ter-
minate the agreement in Nabors Wells had qualifications (ten days' notice
of any amendment or termination and no right to terminate or amend
after initiation of the arbitration proceedings). 32
Indefinite? Using traditional contract analysis, the court of appeals
held that the arbitration program reflects a "meaningful agreement," be-
cause, considered as a whole, the program provides for the arbitration of
disputes in "clear and definite language." 33
Unconscionable? The court of appeals rejected on factual and eviden-
tiary grounds the argument that the arbitration agreement allowed the
employer to unilaterally select the arbitrator, and the argument that the
costs of the arbitration were excessive or prohibitive. 34
Equivalent, accessible forum? Finally, the employee suggested that the
arbitration agreement impeded his ability to vindicate his statutory rights
under the Texas Labor Code. To evaluate this contention, the court of
appeals referred to the approach outlined by the Texas Supreme Court in
its 2008 decision in In re Poly-America, L.P.3 5 for evaluating arbitration
procedures as applied to statutory claims. According to In re Poly-
America, L.P., the arbitration agreement is enforceable if the agreement
"does not waive the substantive rights and remedies the statute affords
and the arbitration procedures are fair, such that the employee may 'ef-
fectively vindicate his statutory rights." 36 The Nabors Wells court con-
cluded that the employee had not made any such showing here; rather,
the employee had complained only that the use of arbitration deprived
28. In re NEXT Fin. Group, Inc., 271 S.W.3d 263, 267, 269-70 (Tex. 2008).
29. Id. at 268.
30. Nos. 13-08-00397-CV, 13-08-00451-CV, 2009 WL 200987, at *4-7 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi Jan., 27, 2009, no pet.) (men. op., not designated for publication).
31. Id. at *4.
32. Id. at *5.
33. Id. at *6.
34. Id.
35. 262 S.W.3d 337, 349 (Tex. 2008).
36. Id. (quoting In re Halliburton, 80 S.W.3d 566, 572 (Tex. 2002)).
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him of the right of trial by jury.37
B. WHEN IS AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT NOT ENFORCEABLE?
1. Waiver of Arbitration by Substantially Invoking Judicial Process
A window of opportunity for avoiding an arbitration agreement was
pushed open in the previous Survey year by the Texas Supreme Court in
the controversial and highly-publicized opinion in Perry Homes v. Cull.38
The political controversy surrounding the decision aside, the supreme
court in Perry Homes acknowledged a long list of activities by a litigant
that other courts had previously suggested might constitute "substantially
invoking the judicial process" amounting to waiver.39 Then, seeming to
hold its breath by noting, "To date, we have never found such a waiver,"
the supreme court found such a waiver. 40 Not surprisingly, several deci-
sions in this Survey year elaborated upon suggestions that the judicial
process had been "substantially invoked" for purposes of finding that the
party seeking to compel arbitration was deemed to have waived its op-
portunity. Two Fifth Circuit opinions warrant attention.
In a mesothelioma case, Nicholas v. KBR, Inc.,41 it was the widow, curi-
ously enough, seeking to compel arbitration. The Fifth Circuit took no-
tice of this, observing that the defendant in a lawsuit is ordinarily the
party seeking to move the case to arbitration.42 Further, the Fifth Circuit
noted that it has not yet "expressly drawn a distinction between the
waiver analysis when applied to a plaintiff and that applied to a defen-
dant."43 Yet, the Fifth Circuit continued, "we have recognized that the
decision to file suit typically indicates a 'disinclination' to arbitrate."44
The record, though, revealed that the widow had done more than file
suit. Rather, she had (1) filed suit in Texas state court; (2) resisted re-
moval to federal court; (3) filed a first amended complaint; (4) filed a
joint discovery/case management plan; (5) responded to written discovery
requests; and (6) sat for her deposition, all without hinting at the possibil-
ity of arbitrating.45 Despite all these actions, the decision appears to
stand for the proposition that simply filing the lawsuit may have consti-
tuted waiver. The Fifth Circuit concluded that "the act of a plaintiff filing
suit without asserting an arbitration clause constitutes substantial invoca-
tion of the judicial process, unless an exception applies." 46 The Fifth Cir-
37. Nabors Wells Servs., Ltd. v. Herrera, Nos. 13-08-00397-CV, 13-08-00451-CV, 2009
WL 200987, at *7 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Jan. 27, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op., not desig-
nated for publication).
38. See 258 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. 2008). See Will Pryor, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62
SMU L. REv. 843, 845-47 (2009) (discussing the Perry Homes decision).
39. Perry Homes, 258 S.W.3d at 589-90.
40. Id. at 590, 597.
41. 565 F.3d 904, 905 (5th Cir. 2009).
42. Id. at 908.
43. Id.
44. Id. (citing several decisions using the term "disinclination" in this context).
45. Id. at 906.
46. Id. at 908.
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cuit went on to emphasize that, "short of directly saying so in open court,
it is difficult to see how a party could more clearly 'evince[ ] a desire to
resolve [a] . . . dispute through litigation rather than arbitration,' than by
filing a lawsuit going to the merits of an otherwise arbitrable dispute." 4 7
The Fifth Circuit could have relied upon a litany of litigation activity in
finding waiver, but instead seems to have suggested that merely filing suit
is the new standard.
In Petroleum Pipe Americas Corp. v. Jindal Saw, Ltd. ,48 the Fifth Cir-
cuit considered the waiver argument when the underlying dispute con-
cerned the enforceability of a previous settlement agreement between the
parties. Among other things, one of the parties "(1) delayed seeking ar-
bitration until a year after PPA filed suit; (2) removed the case to federal
court; (3) filed counterclaims that relate to the Settlement Agreement;
(4) participated in discovery and numerous discovery meetings; and (5)
sought a ruling from the district court on the interpretation of the Settle-
ment Agreement." 49 The prejudice of delay and expense to one party
after the other has "substantially invoked judicial process" seems at the
heart of most of these waiver decisions. But it was another kind of abuse
that seemed to bother the Fifth Circuit in Petroleum Pipe. The record
reflected that the district court, though not issuing a final order, had given
a very clear indication of how the court intended to rule on the settlement
agreement. This was crucial to the Fifth Circuit's decision. "The lack of a
formal ruling does not convince us that [one party], having learned that
the district court was not receptive to its arguments, should be allowed a
second bite at the apple through arbitration."50 In other words, it seemed
fundamentally unfair to allow a litigant to proceed with litigation until the
moment it became apparent that the result was going to be adverse to
him, and then to allow the litigant to try an alternative, and hopefully
rosier, path.
2. Court, Not the Arbitrator, Decides Competency of a Party
In another victory for a party seeking to avoid arbitration, this time a
party claiming she was mentally incompetent to assent to a contract, the
Texas Supreme Court concluded that the trial court, not the arbitrator,
should decide the issue of capacity.5 1 For decades, courts have wandered
all over the road when trying to determine whether the court or the arbi-
trator should rule on a defense that an entire contract is unenforceable or
47. Id. (alterations in original) (omitting internal citation) (quoting Gulf Guar. Life
Ins. Co. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 304 F.3d 476, 484 (5th Cir. 2002)).
48. 575 F.3d 476, 478-79 (5th Cir. 2009).
49. Id. at 481.
50. Id. at 482. Several other decisions address waiver arguments relating to substantial
invocation of the litigation process. See Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Bryce, 271 S.W.3d 347, 556
(Tex. App.-Tyler 2009, no pet.); Holmes, Woods & Diggs v. Gentry, No. 05-08-00723-CV,
2009 WL 2152562, at *3 (Tex. App.-Dallas July 21, 2009, no pet.). Both opinions ex-
pressly follow Perry Homes v. Cull. Each case describes the extensive, aggressive litigation
activity and explains that any result other than findings of waiver would have been curious.
51. In re Morgan Stanley & Co., 293 S.W.3d 182, 189 (Tex. 2009). -
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void, and whether the result should depend on "only" the validity of the
arbitration clause or "also" the validity of the entire contract being chal-
lenged. 52 In In re Morgan Stanley, the Texas Supreme Court viewed the
case as raising a federal-law question of first impression, thus requiring
the Texas Supreme Court to "anticipate how the U.S. Supreme Court
would decide the issue."53 Quoting from an article by Professor Alan
Rau, the supreme court concluded: "To send a dispute to arbitration
where 'not only' the arbitration clause itself, but 'also,' in addition, the
'entire' agreement is subject to challenge, is to lose sight of the only im-
portant question-which is the existence of a legally enforceable assent to
submit to arbitration." 54  As a result, the supreme court remanded the
case to the trial court for a finding on the issue of competency.55
3. Disputes Not Covered by the Arbitration Agreement
Some cases find that an arbitration agreement is valid and binding, but
that the underlying dispute falls outside the scope of the disputes contem-
plated by the parties when agreeing to arbitrate. For instance, Jones v.
Halliburton Co. 56 required the Fifth Circuit to examine whether claims by
an employee of Halliburton/KBR about being gang-raped by coworkers
in her bedroom in employer-provided housing while overseas were arbi-
trable. The employer/employee agreement required arbitration of claims
"related to [her] employment" or claims for personal injury "arising in
the workplace."57 The claimant raised an alternative argument: Even if
the claims were otherwise covered by the arbitration agreement, the doc-
trine of unclean hands should preclude the equitable relief of specific per-
formance of that clause. -The district court deemed all of her claims
arbitrable except the claims for assault and battery; intentional infliction
of emotional distress; negligent hiring, retention, and supervision; and
false imprisonment.58
In an extensive opinion relying on an elaborate recitation of the under-
lying facts, the Fifth Circuit affirmed, concluding that it need not reach
the unclean hands argument. 59 "The one consensus emerging from this
analysis is that it is fact-specific, and concerns an issue about which courts
disagree." 60 The Fifth Circuit wrestled with the seeming contradiction
that the claimant argued that her injuries were related to and within the
scope of her employment for purposes of applying for workers' compen-
sation benefits, but were not related to her employment or arising in the
52. See id. at 185-89 (discussing caselaw on these topics).
53. Id. at 189.
54. Id. at 190 (quoting Alan Scott Rau, Everything You Really Need to Know About
"Separability" in Seventeen Simple Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 1, 17 (2003)).
55. Id.
56. 583 F.3d 228, 230 (5th Cir. 2009).
57. Id. at 231 (quoting the agreement).
58. Id. at 233 (discussing the trial proceedings and the decision).
59. Id. at 242.
60. Id. at 240.
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workplace for purposes of determining the scope of the arbitration
agreement.
In interpreting the arbitration provision at issue, . . . we conclude
that the provision's scope certainly stops at Jones' bedroom door
.... As such, it was not contradictory for Jones to receive workers'
compensation under a standard that allows recovery solely because
her employment created the "zone of special danger" which led to
her injuries, yet claim, in the context of arbitration, that the allega-
tions the district court deemed non-arbitrable did not have a "signifi-
cant relationship" to her employment contract.61
In other words, the discrepancy or the inconsistency regarding the scope
of her employment could be reconciled by the different legal standards
applied in the separate inquiries.
4. Compliance Legally Impossible?
In an unreported decision from the San Antonio Court of Appeals,
Eastland v. Camp Mystic, Inc.,62 a commercial lease had a curious rent
calculation formula that included multiplying one of four specified rates
by the replacement cost of the demised premises on January 1 of each
year. Finding nothing inherently wrong with an arbitration clause itself in
the lease, the court of appeals agreed with the trial court that, because the
"replacement cost" of real estate is not ascertainable, the arbitration
agreement was not enforceable. 63 The court of appeals did not express
the problem as one of legal impossibility, but that appears to be what it
described.
C. THE BACK END: WHEN SHOULD AN ARBITRATION AWARD BE
CONFIRMED?
When a private judge (an arbitrator) signs an arbitration award, what
happens next? What happens when one side wants to enforce the award?
Conversely, what happens when one side wants the award vacated or set
aside? Under federal, as well as state statutory schemes, either side can
proceed in a local court of "competent jurisdiction" for relief. When a
trial court either confirms the award or sets it aside, an appeal may result.
1. The Aftermath of Hall Street Associates v. Mattel
An avalanche of appellate decisions in the Survey year fall in line with
the 2008 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Hall Street Associates v.
Mattel, Inc.64 A Fifth Circuit case, Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Ba-
con,65 arose from an arbitration panel's order that an investment advisor
61. Id. at 239.
62. Nos. 04-08-00675-CV, 04-08-00741-CV, 2009 WL 260523, at *1 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2009, pet. denied) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
63. Id. at *4.
64. See 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
65. 562 F.3d 349, 350 (5th Cir. 2009).
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pay a former customer $256,000. The trial court, concluding that the
arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law, granted the advisor's request to
vacate the award.66 In light of Hall Street, however, the Fifth Circuit
disagreed and vacated the trial court's decision and remanded the case
for further consideration. 67 As the Fifth Circuit reasoned, "[Mianifest
disregard of the law is no longer an independent ground for vacating arbi-
tration awards under the FAA. Hall Street effectively overrules our pre-
vious authority to the contrary . . . ."6
After Hall Street, the specific, but exclusive, grounds for vacatur in the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) remain.69 Yet, as the unreported Fifth
Circuit decision in United Forming, Inc. v. FaulknerUSA, LP70 demon-
strates, establishing any of these specific grounds is quite difficult. In
United Forming, the appellant challenged the arbitration award by argu-
ing that one of the arbitration panel members had failed to make proper
pre-arbitration disclosures regarding a former law partner's previous rep-
resentation of and service on the board of a predecessor to the appellant.
In addition, the appellant accused two of the arbitrators of "actual bias"
based upon statements and comments made during the hearing.71 Fi-
nally, the appellant argued that the award constituted "misconduct" or
"misbehavior" under the FAA because the award was so contrary to the
law.7 2 As the Fifth Circuit noted, the appellant "was careful not to use
the phrase 'manifest disregard of the law' . . . mindful that we have held
that Hall Street has overruled the use of that standard."73 Finding insuffi-
cient evidence presented by the appellant to support the first two chal-
lenges, the Fifth Circuit concluded:
We need not reach the question of whether an intentional complete
disregard of the applicable law could constitute 'misbehavior' under
the FAA because we conclude that such a situation is not presented
here. Even if the AAA panel's decision was erroneous-a question
we do not reach-it was at least debatable. 74
Texas courts of appeals decisions also bear the imprint of Hall Street.
In Allstyle Coil Co. v. Carreon,75 a claimant prevailed against his em-
66. Id.
67. Id. at 358.
68. Id. at 350.
69. The exclusive grounds for vacatur in the FAA are: "(1) where the award was pro-
cured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was evident partiality or cor-
ruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of
misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing
to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded
their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon
the subject matter submitted was not made." 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006).
70. No. 09-50073, 2009 WL 3444285, at *1-2 (5th Cir. 2009) (not selected for publica-
tion in the Federal Reporter).




75. 295 S.W.3d 42 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet).
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ployer in a workers' compensation non-subscriber case after the em-
ployer had insisted on arbitrating. The employer, disappointed with the
result, contended that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law and
failed to base his award on any recognizable legal standard. Relying on
Hall Street, the Houston First Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court
and affirmed the award. 76
The unreported decision in LeFoumba v. Legend Classic Homes, Ltd.77
also applies the Hall Street standard. This appeal from a trial court's affir-
mation of an arbitration award concerned a reduction by the arbitrator,
in a modification requested by one of the parties, of the attorneys' fees
awarded. The total amount of the reduction and the amount in dispute
on the appeal was $190.78 Appellant argued that the modified award
should have been vacated because "(1) the modified award was procured
by 'undue means,' (2) the arbitrator exceeded her authority, and (3) the
modified award 'violates law and public policy.'" 79 The court of appeals
dismissed the "public policy" complaint because it is not one of the four
exclusive grounds for vacatur of an FAA award that remain after Hall
Street.80 The second argument, "undue means," was not supported by
any proof, and "a mere mistake of law is insufficient to vacate an arbitra-
tion award on the basis of 'undue means."' 81 Finally, the court of appeals
rejected the "exceeded authority" argument: "[T]he appropriate inquiry
is not whether the arbitrator decided an issue correctly, but instead
whether she had the authority to decide the issue at all."8 2
2. Finding of Fraudulent Inducement of the Underlying Contract
There have been decades of inconsistency by courts trying to determine
whether a trial court or an arbitrator should rule on a fundamental chal-
lenge as to whether the contract with the arbitration clause was fraudu-
lently induced. But what is the correct result when an arbitrator finds
that the contract was, in fact, fraudulently induced? Should the arbitra-
tor, at that point, set down her pen and consider all other matters in dis-
pute vitiated because there is no underlying agreement? The Houston
First Court of Appeals addressed this question in Fogal v. Stature Con-
struction, Inc.83 In a helpful analysis, the court of appeals explained that,
although "a contract induced by fraud is no contract at all because it lacks
76. Id. at 45.
77. No. 14-08-00243-CV, 2009 WL 3109875, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
Sept. 17, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
78. Id. at *1.
79. Id.
80. Id. at *2.
81. Id.
82. Id. at *3. (resisting the temptation to summarize each and every survey year deci-
sion expressly relying on Hall Street). See also Xtria L.L.C. v. Int'l Ins. Alliance Inc., 286
S.W.3d 583 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2009, pet. denied); In re Chestnut Energy Partners,
Inc., 300 S.W.3d 386 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, pet. denied); Ancor Holdings, LLC v. Peter-
son, Goldman & Villani, Inc., 294 S.W.3d 818 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.).
83. 294 S.W.3d 708 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).
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agreement of the parties . . . this does not affect arbitrability of the dis-
pute."84 Further, the fraudulent inducement alleged, if it is to be ruled
upon by a court rather than the arbitrator, "must specifically relate to the
Arbitration Addendum itself," not generally to the contract in its en-
tirety.8 5 So the arbitrator need not put down her pen. Quoting an ear-
lier Fifth Circuit decision, the court of appeals agreed, "'[E]ven if the
arbitrator concludes that the agreement was void, and the parties are re-
turned to their pre-agreement positions as if the agreement never existed,
the agreement existed long enough to give the arbitrator the power to
decide the dispute."86
D. THE BACK END: WHEN SHOULD AN ARBITRATION AWARD BE
SET ASIDE?
By now you may be thinking that there certainly must not have been a
circumstance or condition presented in the Survey year which caused an
appellate court in Texas to vacate or set aside an award. Although these
cases are rare, they do occur from time to time, and a few were decided
during this Survey period.
1. Public Policy
In the unreported decision in Symetra National Life Insurance Co. v.
Rapid Settlements, Ltd.,87 the arbitrator had ordered one party to make
structured settlement payments directly to another party, although the
payment scheme had not been approved by a court. The appellants ar-
gued that the order violated the public policy of the state of Texas as set
out in the Texas Structured Settlement Protection Act (SSPA). 88 This
Act, as the Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals explained, requires
court approval of any transfer of a structured settlement payment. 89
Finding that the FAA did not preempt the SSPA because the statutes
were not in conflict, the court of appeals held that the arbitration award
violated the public policy of the state of Texas. "[T]he SSPA does[ ] not
prevent the parties from agreeing to arbitrate or proceeding to arbitra-
tion; it only limits what can be accomplished through arbitration . . . ."90
2. Bias
In Karlseng v. Cooke,91 the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a trial
court abused its discretion in denying a request for a continuance to allow
84. Id. at 719.
85. Id.
86. Id. (quoting Will-Drill Res., Inc. v. Samson Res. Co., 352 F.3d 211, 218-19 (5th Cir.
2003)).
87. No. 14-07-00880-CV, 2009 WL 1057339, at *1-2 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
Apr. 21, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
88. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 141.004 (Vernon 2005).
89. Symetra Nat'1 Life Ins., 2009 WL 1057339, at *3.
90. Id. at *5.
91. 286 S.W.3d 51, 58 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.).
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discovery in the face of evidence that one arbitrator had failed to disclose
a prior relationship with lead counsel for one of the parties.92 The appel-
lant, with only three weeks notice after the award was issued, apparently
scrambled to present evidence of the conflict. The trial court, however,
denied the motion for continuance.93 The court of appeals concluded
that, at the "very least," the appellant had produced evidence "sufficient
to raise a bona fide question" about whether the arbitrator "failed to dis-
close information he had a duty to disclose." 94 Further, the trial court
could have answered this question only by granting the motion for contin-
uance.95 Thus, the court of appeals held that the trial court abused its
discretion by denying the request for continuance.96
Karlseng is a notable exception to the pattern in many cases of alleged
bias. Most challenges based on alleged bias fail, probably because there
is virtually no evidence to support the bias contention other than sugges-
tions concerning the conduct, demeanor, or comments of the arbitrators
during the hearing, or an argument that the result was so misguided that
bias is the only plausible explanation. In Karlseng, by contrast, the appel-
lants were able to generate testimony from a former wife of one of the
attorneys involved about the social relationship between the attorney and
the arbitrator, an expert testified that certain information "absolutely"
should have been disclosed, and an out-of-state lawyer testified about a
previous arbitration hearing (undisclosed) that he had been involved in
along with the attorney and the arbitrator whose relationship was being
questioned.97
3. Arbitrators Cannot Exceed Their Powers
In Townes Telecommunications, Inc. v. Travis, Wolff & Co.,98 a chal-
lenge to an arbitration award succeeded on the basis of one of the four
bases for vacatur set out in the FAA. The arbitrators had allocated costs
of the arbitration between the two parties in the face of an arbitration
agreement which stated that costs "may not be allocated between the par-
ties." 99 Citing Hall Street, the Dallas Court of Appeals pointed out that
this situation satisfied one of the four statutory bases for vacatur-specifi-
cally, that the arbitrators had exceeded their powers.100
III. CONCLUSION
The popularity of mediation continues to rise. But while the total num-
ber of arbitrations being conducted appears to continue to rise from year
92. Id.
93. Id. at 52.




98. 291 S.W.3d 490, 491 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, pet. denied).
99. Id. at 494.
100. Id. at 493 n.1.
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to year, the overall satisfaction level of participants in the process may be
declining. The result in Allstyle Coil Co. v. Carreon'01-rejecting a chal-
lenge to a $217,000 award for an employee of a non-subscribing em-
ployer-may suggest why. For the last several decades, the imposition of
arbitration clauses in consumer and employment settings has come at the
behest of product manufacturers, homebuilders, insurers, employers, and
others. But sometimes a claimant prevails in arbitration-and prevails
"big"-leaving the unhappy homebuilder, employer, etc. with virtually no
avenue for a meaningful appeal. Coupled with caps on damages and
other successful "tort reforms" lobbied to legislatures by these same in-
terests over the same time period, the courts are no longer the menacing
forum they once were. So the "success rate" of arbitration, when mea-
sured by the manufacturer/employer as the collective experience of a now
significant number of arbitration awards, as well as the overall savings of
legal fees and costs, may be in decline, at the same time that the court
system, now layered with statutory and appellate protections, is no longer
perceived as the home court for "plaintiffs' personal injury lawyers,"
"frivolous lawsuits," and "runaway juries." A significant reevaluation of
arbitration by those who have been pursuing it for decades is taking
place, and it will continue for years to come.
101. 295 S.W.3d 42, 42 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
2010] 289
290 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63
